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1. Introduction
This paper intends to describe both the formulation and implementation of a programme to
‘regularise’ the legal residence status of a large group of former Mozambican refugees in
South Africa and present a brief critique (from a mainly legal perspective) on the
implementation of the regularisation programme itself.
2. Background to the Status Regularisation Programme
It has been estimated that out of the countless numbers of Mozambican nationals who fled
to South Africa as a cause of the period of destabilisation and ensuring war in Mozambique
(in which South Africa played a key role) 350,000 remained in the country by the early
1990s3.  These persons settled mainly (though not exclusively) in the former “homeland”
                                        
1   This working paper is based partly on comments originally submitted by LHR to the Task Team in
September 1998 (drafted by Schneider), and the outcome of various Task Team meetings.  It
furthermore draws on extensive feedback received from Nicola Johnston, included in a paper
published by Johnston entitled “The Point of No Return: Evaluating the Amnesty for Mozambican
Refugees in South Africa, Migration Policy Brief No. 6, Southern African Migration Project: Cape
Town, 2001.  Any unacknowledged statements reflect first-hand experiences of the contributors.
Note:  Not all original members of the “Task Team” became “outreach partners” and some NGOs later
pulled out of the programme (including LHR).  In this article, “local NGOs” refer to those who at some
stage contributed (collectively or individually) to the Task Team and/or “outreach programme”.
2    Handmaker and Schneider were, formerly, co-ordinators of Lawyers for Human Rights’ (LHR)
Refugee Rights Project.  Handmaker is an international lawyer and freelance consultant, based in The
Netherlands.  Schneider is currently a policy advisor with the government of Canada.  Nicola
Johnston was formerly head of Wits Refugee Research Programme (RRP).  Both LHR and the RRP
were involved in the programme’s Task Team.  However, while LHR later discontinued its
participation in the FMR Amnesty programme, RRP remained directly involved throughout the
duration of both the SADC and FMR Amnesties, participated in the FMR programme’s outreach
programme and also monitored the FMR Amnesty’s implementation.
3    Dolan, C., “Policy Choices for the New South Africa”, in de Villiers and Reitzes, Southern African
Migration, 53-58, quoted in Crush, J., “Covert Operations: Clandestine Migration, Temporary Work
and Immigration Policy in South Africa”, SAMP Migration Policy Series No 1, 1997, at note 50.
3areas of South Africa, in the rural border areas4.  Because of they were never granted formal
status, they remain undocumented and so it has proven impossible to precisely determine
the size of this group, which in 1998 was (nevertheless) still said to comprise the single
largest group of “undocumented migrants” currently in South Africa5.
Under the terms of a tripartite agreement between the government of South Africa, UNHCR
and the government of Mozambique, these persons were retroactively recognised as
refugees in 1993 (on a group basis) by the government of South Africa, for the purposes of
a UNHCR co-ordinated repatriation programme6.  As a result, between the period 1993 and
1994, some 65,000 Mozambicans returned to Mozambique.
On 4 December 1996, it was announced that the South African Cabinet granted an
“amnesty” to the former Mozambican refugees who remained.  Unlike previous amnesties
for other categories of undocumented persons7, the cabinet decision did not specify that
proof of economic activity was necessary.  It was purely intended to benefit persons from
Mozambique who left as a consequence of hostilities in the country up until the Renamo /
Frelimo Peace Accord in 1992.
                                        
4    N. Johnston, “Accessing the SADC Amnesty: The rural experience” in The New South Africans?
Immigration Amnesties and Their Aftermath, eds. J. Crush and V. Williams, SAMP, 1999, at 46
5    Prohibited Persons, Human Rights Watch, March 1998, at 19.  Government put the official figure
at 90,000
6    The programme’s implementation generated some criticism.  See Crush, J. 1997 (Ibid), C. Dolan,
Report to Norwegian refugee council, RRP, 1995, G. Rodgers 1996 (Masters thesis Dept of
Anthropology - University of the Witwatersrand), C. Dolan, Ibid, ‘Aliens Aboard: Mozambicans in the
New South Africa’, C. Dolan, Indicator SA, Vol 12, No. 3 (Winter 1995), p. 29 and K.B. Wilson with J.
Nunes, ‘Repatriation to Mozambique’, When Refugees Go Home:  African Experiences, eds. T. Allen
and H. Morsink, publ. United Nations Research Institute, 1994.
7    These included the “SADC Amnesty” and “Miner’s Amnesty”, see The New South Africans?
Immigration Amnesties and Their Aftermath, eds. J. Crush and V. Williams, SAMP, 1999
42.1 Estimating numbers
Despite much uncertainty in estimating numbers, the government later declared that it
believed 90,000 would be eligible under this amnesty for former Mozambican refugees
(“FMR Amnesty”)8, rather than 220,000, as estimated by some local NGOs9.  The
government recorded that, out of the 146,675 Mozambicans who applied for formal legal
status through the “SADC Exemption” 10, (one of the other amnesty programmes), 85,520
had been approved11.  This confirmed that at least some of these persons included the
target group of the FMR Amnesty, though it was impossible to determine exact numbers
with any certainty.  Thus, even on the most conservative estimates, the end result was that
at least 135,000 former refugees remained in South Africa without formal legal residential
status, rendering them subject to apprehension, detention and deportation as “prohibited
persons” 12.
2.2 Cessation clause / delayed implementation
However, without any plans announced for the implementation of the FMR Amnesty, the
Tripartite Commission, composed of representatives from UNHCR and the South African and
Mozambique governments decided on 31 December 1996 to declare the social and political
                                        
8     Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, s.1.4(c), Department of Home Affairs
9    ‘Legalising the status of Mozambican former-refugees currently residing in South Africa,
Recommendations for Implementation’, prepared by local NGOs “at the request of AWEPA” by
members of the Task Team.  This document was “presented to the South African Department of
Home Affairs by Dr Jan Nico Scholten, President of AWEPA”, to the South African government on 5
March 1998.   At page 3, “it has been estimated that perhaps as many as 220,000 Mozambicans (sic)
former refugees still reside in South Africa”.  It must be noted, however, that a number of FMRs
gained formal status through the earlier, SADC exemption / amnesty.
10    The 1996 “SADC Amnesty” aimed to regularise the status of Southern African Development
Community (SADC) citizens who had been employed and resident in the Republic for the previous
five years
11  Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, Ibid., at s. 1.4(d)
12  The uncertainty in numbers further emphasised the difficulties that would be faced in distinguishing
former Mozambican refugees (FMRs) from other Mozambican migrants, the majority of whom were
undocumented.
5situation in Mozambique to amount to a “significant change of circumstances” warranting
the imposition of a “cessation clause”13, thus ending the period of formal ‘refugee status’ for
this sector of the population resident in South Africa.  The FMR Amnesty seemed to be
forgotten, while other programmes of amnesty took precedence14.  The reasons were said to
be largely financial, with government declaring that it lacked the financial means to
implement the amnesty15.  But there also appeared to be both departmental and political
resistance, in light of certain public statements16, continued delays17 and concerted efforts
on the part of departments responsible for border control to apprehend and deport “illegal
immigrants”, including in the very areas which contained the largest numbers of potential
applicants18.
2.3 Project formulation / formation of AWEPA Task Team
Towards the end of 1997 and following a seminar held in Nelspruit in June 199719, AWEPA20,
a European NGO based in Holland, approached a number of “local” (South African) NGOs.
                                        
13    Article 1C of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, provides that refugee
status shall “cease to apply” to a person if:
‘(6) …because of the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee
have ceased to exist, (he is) able to return to the country of his former habitual residence…’
14    For a comprehensive discussion / assessment of these amnesties, see The New South Africans?
Immigration Amnesties and Their Aftermath, eds. J. Crush and V. Williams, SAMP, 1999
15     Presentation to the Home Affairs Parliamentary Portfolio Committee by the Director-General:
Home Affairs, 5 May 1998.
16     In June 1999, the same Departmental official responsible for decisions on the FMR Amnesty
programme made a number of shockingly xenophobic statements in public on “Africa Refugee Day”
(devoted to tackling xenophobia and raising awareness of refugees in South Africa).  Reported in
‘Rights groups slam “xenophobic” official’, Mail and Guardian, 5 to 11 November, 1999.
17     A letter from AWEPA to Task Team members on 8 March 1999, confirmed that the Department
of Home Affairs decided to (further) “postpone the exemption and outreach programme until July,
after the elections”.   As transpired, the programme only got underway in August.
18    “Illegal rampages by home affairs”, Mail and Guardian, May 15-21 1998.  Discussed in further
detail later.
19   “Prolonged Hospitality or Return Home?”, seminar organised by AWEPA, Nelspruit, June 1997.
6AWEPA sought local partners to collaborate in a wide-ranging project, which would come
together in a Task Team to oversee the regularisation programme’s implementation.
AWEPA
promised it would raise funds in order to realise this.  Finally, a meeting was held in Pretoria
in February 1997, to which AWEPA had invited a number of (mainly South African)
organisations to discuss the project’s draft proposal.
Based on the results of the February 1997 meeting, a Task Team was declared to have been
formed (initially of NGOs only) for the purposes of providing FMRs with the (alternative)
possibility of either assisted return to Mozambique or assistance in applying for amnesty.
The Task Team later incorporated the Department of Home Affairs and developed into an
“outreach programme” of provincial co-ordination teams, consisting of implementing local
NGOs, identified as “outreach partners” and government-led “mobile units” (discussed in
more detail later) for the purposes of implementing the regularisation / FMR Amnesty
programme.  Responsibility amongst local NGOs was shared, initially for the purposes of
advising potential applicants, organising an information campaign and monitoring the
project.  AWEPA / Refugiado co-ordinated the programme21 and declared it was responsible
for political discussions with the government.
2.4 Objective of the AWEPA Programme
In short, the objective of this programme was to assist former refugees, giving them the
option of being assisted to voluntarily return home, or to apply for regularisation /
permanent residence status through the FMR Amnesty.  Funding for the programme (raised
                                                                                                                              
20    The Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) incorporates “sister” NGOs
AEI (Africa European Institute) and Refugiado, the latter which administratively said to be responsible
for the project whereas the former claimed to be responsible for “political negotiations”.  There was
some confusion regarding the purportedly separate identity of these organisations, which in fact
shared the same management.  But in the end, it was clear that all three were one and the same,
hence general reference in this paper to “AWEPA”.
21  A major logistical problem was that the Refugiado/AWEPA co-ordinator was based in the Western
Cape (several thousand kilometers away from where the regularisation programme was taking place
in Mpumalanga, Northwest, Kwa Zulu Natal and Northern Provinces).  This was felt by NGO outreach
partners to be unnecessarily expensive and restricted the contact between the programme co-
ordinator and the local partner organisations.
7by AWEPA and RRP) provided 19 mobile units, staffed by a representative of the
Department of Home Affairs.  NGO outreach partners, namely three volunteers from local
churches and one para-legal, accompanied these units.  Funds raised by AWEPA covered at
least some percentage of the extra costs incurred by the Department of Home Affairs to
implement this programme, which later extended to cover extra burdens placed on the
Mozambican consulate22.  While at an earlier stage in the formulation of the Task Team
there was to be a separate (independent) monitoring initiative, this never materialised and
so the implementing partners in the project essentially “monitored themselves”23.
2.5 Legal complications
Early in the project’s development, it was very evident that the potential legal issues
involved were going to be complex, not least being the FMRs’ formal lack of legal status
(rendering them constantly vulnerable to apprehension and deportation as “prohibited
persons”)24.  The regional office of UNHCR expressed its concern about not being consulted
by the organisers of this programme and using the term “Mozambican refugee” (in light of
the 1996 “cessation clause”, mentioned above) 25.  At the same time, AWEPA organisers
were urged to elicit further responses from Task Team members26, prior to the programme’s
implementation.
                                        
22 Progress Report, Gerrit ten Velde, ‘Support to the Mozambican Former Refugees of the Period of
Destabilisation’, Field Co-ordinator for Refugiado (AWEPA), March 2000
23    Funding was, however, separately secured by RRP from the European Union Foundation for
Human Rights in South Africa, for the provision of some monitors.
24    See, for example, submission by Lawyers for Human Rights, presented to a meeting organised
by AWEPA of the “Task Team”, Pretoria, 27th February 1998
25    Letter from the Director of Operations for Southern Africa, addressed to the Deputy Minister of
Home Affairs of South Africa, and copied to “Task Team” members, 24 February 1998.  According to
UNHCR, AWEPA did not make any subsequent efforts to involve the organisation.
26    See ‘Legalising the status of Mozambican former-refugees (Ibid), 5 March 1998.  The government
responded to AWEPA on this document, four months later, in June 1998, in a letter (addressed to Dr
Scholten of AWEPA) and disseminated to Task Team members.
8Despite a much publicised “launch” of the programme by the Dutch organisers in April
199827, there were delays for a further year and a half, amidst much negotiation with the
South African government.  The programme only began implementation on 10 August
199928.
It was reported that in the first month of the programme, over 30,000 applications were
received (including family members).  By contrast, even though a survey showed that
“between 20% and 40% of the (former) refugee population (were) still interested in
returning to Mozambique if they (could) get assistance with transport and…support” 29, only
around 40 registered in this same period for assistance to return home30.
At the close of the regularisation programme, 150,592 applications had been received,
whereas only 88 former refugees took up the option of returning to Mozambique
voluntarily31.  Thus, while the programme was designed to “kept both options open”, clearly
most FMRs initially preferred to take their chances with the regularisation procedure and
settle in South Africa rather than return to Mozambique.  The large numbers of
Mozambicans who applied further confirmed that estimates of 220,000 potential applicants
by local NGOs were not so unrealistic, although the organisers of the programme claimed
that many who had applied were “illegal immigrants” who “seized this opportunity to obtain
false papers”32.
                                        
27   “Refugees the focus of new aid group”, Pretoria News , 22 April 1998, p. 12, The Star, 22 April
1998.  Unbeknownst to their “South African partners”, in April 1998 AWEPA initiated an (exclusive)
“UK launch” of the programme in London, England, reported in the UK Press, and later in South
Africa.
28    In March 1999, the “Task Team” was informed that the regularisation programme was to be
suspended, “Return or Remain?  A programme for Mozambican former refugees”, Botshabelo, LHR,
p. 8
29    N. Johnston, “Homeward-bound”, Mail and Guardian, October 1 to 7 1999, 42
30    N. Johnston, “Mozambican refugees get a chance to settle”, Reconstruct, Sunday Independent, 3
Oct. 1999
31    Progress Report, G. ter Velde, Ibid., p. 2
32   Progress Report, G. ter Velde, Ibid., p. 3
93. Policy framework
While the cabinet decision of 4 December 1996 to grant FMRs regularised status provided a
legal basis for the regularisation programme, it did not (publicly) specify the terms33.
In developing a policy framework for the FMR Amnesty, LHR recommended that the Task
Team (and especially the department) draw reference from the previous practice of the
Department.  Specific attention was drawn to “Passport Control Instruction (PCI) No.20 of
1994” (as amended by PCI No. 23 of 1994), which were issued as “Guidelines for Refugee
Status Determination of Mozambicans in South Africa”.  They were produced in conjunction
with the UNHCR’s regional voluntary repatriation programme undertaken in 1994, and
contained a humane and workable set of guidelines believed to be applicable to a mass
programme of the current nature as well.  PCI No. 20 made provision for various scenarios
including:
1) an individual reporting to the Department claiming to be a [former] refugee;
2) an individual apprehended as a suspected illegal alien but who provided
information suggesting he is a [former] refugee;
3) an individual apprehended as an illegal alien when crossing the border or in the
immediate vicinity of the border” 34.
There are additional factors to be noted about the procedures provided for in this
Instruction.  First, once a person was identified as having a claim of being a (former)
                                                                                                                              
33    This paradoxically meant that, while the cabinet decision provided no objective guarantee that
one would qualify, its “unconditional” nature (Department Circular No. 34, Ibid, s.1.1), it did allow room
for flexibility in the event of later appeals, as is indeed currently the case regarding a number of
(pending) appeals of rejected decisions.
34    This latter provision would have been particularly valuable.  There were various (unconfirmed)
instances of applicants in the FMR Amnesty visiting their family in Mozambique for Christmas (which
fell right in the middle of the programme), and had their permits withdrawn at the border.
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refugee they were to be tracked into the relevant procedures.  The same procedures were
followed regardless of whether they presented themselves, or were apprehended as a
suspected illegal alien.
Secondly, once a person was identified as a (former) refugee, they were issued with a
temporary permit valid for six months and an information leaflet outlining their
responsibilities and duties (which, in the case of PCI 20, included renewal of the permit after
six months) 35.
Thirdly, and most crucially, under these Instructions, “if any doubt as to the status of the
applicant existed the applicant should be given the benefit of the doubt.36”
Without any evidence to the contrary, it was assumed that these passport control
instructions had never been revoked.  This meant, in theory, that anyone presenting
themselves as a former Mozambican refugee, or discovered during a section 7 inquiry 37 to
have such a claim would be potentially entitled to a six month temporary residence permit
(subject to conditions outlined in such a permit).  It was suggested that these earlier
instructions serve as “guidelines” for the regularisation programme.
3.1 Departmental Circular No. 34
Details of the conditions under which FMRs38 would be granted status were ultimately
incorporated in Draft Departmental Circular No. 34 of 199939.  While the Circular referred to
                                        
35    As was also the case with the information leaflet distributed during the FMR programme, such
pamphlets were largely irrelevant since most FMRs were illiterate.
36    PCI 20 of 1994, s. 5
37   In terms of section 7 of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991, an immigration officer may question a
person on the basis that they are suspected to be a prohibited person (i.e. without legal residence to
remain in South Africa).
38    AWEPA confusingly referred to FMRs as Refugees during the Period of Destabilisation, or
“RPDs”
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“Draft Guidelines” (emphasis added), its provisions (later modified following consultation
with the NGO outreach partners), were regarded by the Department of Home Affairs as
final.  In addition, the Task Team collectively produced an information pamphlet.
The Guidelines and information pamphlet were later accompanied by a Department of Home
Affairs (Mpumalanga Province regional office) Media Release on the 18th of August (issued
one week after the programme began)40, which provided additional guidance on the
procedure.
The programme was intended to operate within strict time limitations, namely 9 August
1999 and 9 February 200041; applications could only be submitted within this period.
According to the Circular, applications were to be received by “mobile units made available
by AWEPA”, accompanied by “at least one Home Affairs official qualified to take
fingerprints42.
3.2 Inclusion Criteria
The general criteria was indicated by the government in Departmental Circular No. 34:
“Mozambican refugees are citizens of Mozambique who entered South Africa between
1980 and 1992 and live mainly in the Gazankulu, KaNgwane and Winterveldt areas (i.e.
the Northern Province, Mpumalanga and North West.  Some have also settled in the
northern parts of Kwazulu Natal.” 43
                                                                                                                              
39    Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, Draft Guidelines for the Exemption for the Mozambican
Refugees in Terms of Section 28(2) of the Aliens Control Act, 1991 from the Provisions of Section
23(a) of that Act, Department of Home Affairs, 15 July 1999
40    “Support to Mozambican Former Refugees of the Period of Destabilization”, Media Release,
Department of Home Affairs, 18 August 1999.
41   Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, Ibid., at s. 1.5
42   Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, Ibid., at s. 5
43   Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, Ibid., at s. 1.2
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Mozambican refugees were defined as: “citizen(s) of Mozambique who entered South Africa
between 1980 and before 1 January 1993 and lived in the areas mentioned in paragraph
1.2” (above).44  It was explicitly treated as an exclusive definition; in other words it was not
to include other areas (e.g. the industrial areas in Gauteng, where many FMRs worked) 45.
While the wording in the Circular itself was rather vague, it appeared to require that a
Mozambican spouse and children (under 18 years) would be included on the same
application form (presumably of a principal applicant)46.  While this in and of itself was not
particularly unusual (probably to promote administrative efficiency), it could have created
problems (not least being international legal principles on maintaining the family unit) if, for
example, an applicant was rejected.  The Circular was not clear as to whether such a
situation would exclude the spouse and children from applying separately.  On the other
hand, the “information pamphlet” (referred to earlier) suggested that independent
applications would be permitted.
However, during the implementation, there were allegations that families of rejected
applicants had been “blacklisted”.  An example of such a situation was where the “criminal
record” of the principal applicant effectively “implicated” the rest of the family.  The
standard for “rejectable” criminal offences was apparently set rather low, covering even the
selling of liquor without a licence47.
                                                                                                                              
44   Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, Ibid., at s. 4
45    This geographical distinction is one of the more controversial and enduring problems of the FMR
Amnesty programme.  Many FMRs have been refused status under the programme due to their
residence in other parts of the country, purportedly now being considered under administrative
appeal.
46   Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, Ibid., at s. 1.5
47   This example can itself can be seen as a “survival strategy” on the part of certain FMR applicants,
consequent on their inability to obtain formal status in the first place.
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3.3 Need for Clear Eligibility Criteria
South African NGOs who were partners in the Task Team felt it was necessary to have clear
criteria for those who would be eligible for the regularisation of their status in South Africa,
in terms of the 4 December 1996 decision formally granting amnesty.
As a broad principle, it was submitted that those qualifying for the regularisation programme
should have included “any Mozambican who arrived in South Africa before (the Renamo /
Frelimo (Rome) Peace Agreement) in October 1992, as a result of the war in Mozambique”,
and any spouse or child of this person.
The qualifying date, clearly a crucial aspect of admission, was ultimately indicated as
between 1980 and the end of 199248.  The information pamphlet usefully explained who
could apply, indicating that it excluded those who “did not come because of the war” or who
had “committed a crime”.
With respect to the (alternative) choice of obtaining assistance in returning home, it was felt
by local NGOs that special consideration should have been given to ensure the regularisation
programme did not produce unintended results, such as the forced break up of families.  In
addition, the programme needed to ensure that women were not forced into decisions
pertaining to their legal status and future which they would not voluntarily, or otherwise
make (i.e. there should have been particular sensitivity as to gender and “household power”
implications). The argument put forward by the RRP was that women should be able to
apply as principal applicants, a right that they had been frequently denied under the SADC
Amnesty.
As it turned out, the information pamphlet, while encouraging “family applications”, did
indicate that applicants (over the age of 18 years) would be permitted to apply
independently, though it did not explicitly acknowledge these power implications.
                                        
48   Department Circular No. 34, Ibid, s.1.2
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4. Required documentation
Recognising that providing documentation to establish eligibility would be a major problem,
as indeed it is in most refugee contexts, it was felt to be necessary and practicable that the
government agree to a list of documents, which would be admissible as proof of date of
entry to the Republic during the stipulated period.  Concerned local NGOs recommended
that criteria for “primary” documentation49 be broad, supplemented by a procedure for
obtaining credible affidavits50 (“secondary” documentation).
4.1 Affidavits
During the SADC amnesty, applicants were required to obtain affidavits from a very limited
class of persons (e.g. Tribal Authorities), but this wasn’t universally the case.  According to
RRP, affidavits were also permitted from “friends and neighbours”, but these were only as
“supporting evidence”.  This not only made it difficult for some to obtain affidavits, but in
both cases raised a serious secondary problem of extortion and bribery which in turn cut
down on access to the amnesty procedure for those who could not afford to pay for them.
In other words, if the class of persons whose affidavits would be accepted by the
Department of Home Affairs was too narrow (e.g. only Tribal Authorities), this could have
presented a significant barrier to the success of the regularisation programme. The specific
inclusion of ‘Headmen’ and SACC ‘Catholic Mission representatives’ was made on the advice
of local NGOs who had worked closely with (former) refugee settlements in rural areas, and
had experienced the SADC amnesty.  These two classes of individuals reportedly had
extensive knowledge of the target populations and were identified as reliable and
trustworthy.51
                                        
49    “Primary” documents could have included: hospital records, school records, church papers, chief’s or
village headman papers, food ration or employer work cards, and any document issued from an office of the
Department of Home Affairs (or another governmental department).  UNHCR “VRAF card” issued during the
1995/96 repatriation programme, and other documents (e.g. “passport from Mozambique”) could also have been
used.
50    In South Africa, an affidavit is a specific, written form of testimonial evidence, sworn before a recognised
“commissioner of oaths”.
51    According to RRP, during the implementation of the FMR Amnesty, no headmen provided affidavits.
15
It was anticipated that the affidavit procedure would play a critical role in the success of the
regularisation programme.  In agreeing on criteria, it was ultimately necessary to strike a
balance between ensuring maximum access to the regularisation programme for those who
did not have other documentary evidence and devising minimum standards capable of
ensuring the reliability of the affidavits as documentary evidence.  Clear criteria were further
necessary to prevent fraudulent applications52.  Furthermore, a sworn affidavit should have
been seen as having more “weight” (i.e. credibility) than an unsworn affidavit.  Likewise the
weight of a sworn affidavit might have depended on the individual who is submitting it.
4.2 Supporting (secondary) documentation permitted
As it turned out, section 2a of Departmental Circular No. 34 (providing Guidelines to the
FMR Amnesty programme), specified the following documents as “proof that (the applicant)
entered the country before 1 Jan 1993, and reside (sic) in one of the above-mentioned
areas:
1. The yellow card issued by the refugee camps (in Gazankulu, KaNgwane and
Winterveldt areas)
2. A section 41 permit (as a prohibited person, in terms of the Aliens Control Act
96 of 1991)
3. VRAF (Voluntary Repatriation Application Form, issued by the UNHCR
4. Ration card for food received by some refugees when they first entered South
Africa
                                        
52    LHR, in its September 1998 submission, urged that the affidavit should:
(a) be sworn and legally notarized by a “commissioner of oaths” (in South Africa, this includes
police officers, who are required to notarise documents, including affidavits, free of charge, upon
request);
(b) not be made out by the applicant
(c) instead be made out by
(i) any citizen of the Republic who
A. is honest and trustworthy, and
B. has first hand knowledge of the residency of the applicant in the Republic during the
period which makes him or her eligible for the regularisation programme, or
(ii) the Headman of a recognised “refugee settlement” (recognised by the tribal authority, or
(iii) a representative of the South African Council of Churches (represented by both catholic
and protestant missions), which has been active in the relevant refugee settlement and who, as a
representative, has knowledge of the applicant on behalf of whom he or she is testifying.
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5. Identity card issued by tribal authorities
6. Marriage document
7. Referral letter from tribal authorities where applicant resides”
Section 2a also permitted affidavits from employers (no nationality specification) and
friends, relatives and neighbours (in possession of a South African ID).  “Proof of
Mozambican citizenship”, it stated, would be proved “by means of an identification card /
document issued by the Mozambican government”.  The government of Mozambique was
later obliged to expand its consulate capacity (supported by AWEPA) to try and
accommodate this substantial, unanticipated demand.  Ultimately the “passbooks” issued by
the former Gazankulu and Kangwane “homeland” authorities were the most commonly used
and accepted.
4.3 Burden of Proof
It was ultimately the responsibility of the applicants to show that they qualified for an
exemption53.  This was to be established by the submission of “primary” documents and
“referral” letters.  Affidavits made by employers, friends, relatives or neighbours in
possession of a South African identity document were not only accepted, as it was
mentioned.  The Department in some instances also interviewed some persons who
provided affidavits, in order to strengthen certain applications.
4.4 Difficulties faced in relation to documentation
This broad list of documents notwithstanding, difficulties faced by applicants (in many
instances taken up with the Department) primarily concerned documentation, with
Mozambicans unable to prove their Mozambican identity54.  This included applicants who
had previously changed their names (and obtained fraudulent ID documents) in order to
                                        
53   Department of Home Affairs Media Release, 18 August 1999, section 2.2.1
54    N. Johnston, Ibid, states that “officials have been sending away about 70 percent of the
applicants” because they “lack documents to prove their Mozambican identity”.
17
register for schools and ‘matric’ examinations and now wished to regularise their status.
Many of these people allegedly wished to come forward, but were reluctant, after the
government took the position that applicants in possession of false identity documents
would be “removed from the country”.
Applications were, according to the Circular, to be “rejected on the spot”, if they came from
persons who were not Mozambican citizens or who entered after the 31 December 1992 cut-
off date, and “no appeal” was to be allowed55.  Nevertheless, some appeals were considered
on the grounds that some applicants had been moving back and forth across the border, but
were based in South Africa.
5. Access to the regularisation programme and issues relating to
apprehension and deportation
Early on in discussions by the Task Team on the terms of implementation of the
programme, the Department issued a number of contradictory and confusing statements on
the subject of apprehension and deportation of persons who might potentially qualify for
residence in terms of the programme.   This was a critical area to have clarity on if there
was to be a prospect of large-scale participation in the programme.  South African NGOs
who were partners in the Task Team maintained that if the persisting practice of arbitrary
apprehension, detention and deportation continued this would have had a significant
negative impact on the regularisation programme, as it ultimately did.
NGOs participating in the Task Team requested a guarantee for both those voluntarily
coming forward to apply for the programme and those apprehended as suspected illegal
aliens but who seem to fulfil the criteria making them eligible for the programme.  A
“moratorium” on deportations was proposed to the Task Team56, in the face of growing
                                        
55   Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, Ibid., at s.2.  RRP observed that, in practice, applications
from Mozambican nationals who ostensibly did not qualify were not arrested, respecting an
agreement with the Task Team that no arrests would take place until the application phase was over.
This did allow the DHA to register such persons on the computerised “Movement Control Register”
database.
56   “Legalising the status of Mozambican former-refugees”, Ibid Note 8, item 4.3
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allegations that the authorities “routinely” violated constitutional principles in apprehending
suspected undocumented migrants57.  Unfortunately, this recommendation was seen as
impracticable by the Department at National level and deportations continued during the
period leading up to the programme’s implementation58.
At one stage in negotiations within the Task Team, the Department of Home Affairs
maintained that the fact that FMRs were occasionally deported to Mozambique was not
within its regulatory scope, as there were a number of authorities responsible for border
control.   However, given that Home Affairs was the only government department capable of
issuing instructions on the handling of suspected illegal aliens, it was legally incorrect for
them to state this.  In fact, any official apprehending a suspected illegal alien under the
authority of the Aliens Control Act was required to conduct a “section 7 inquiry” to test
whether their initial “reasonable suspicion” (that the person is an illegal alien) had any basis.
In the past, instructions had been issued pertaining to the conduct of section 7 inquiries.
However, there seemed to be few clear instructions relating to conduct at the initial
apprehension stage59.
In the end, while a number of apprehensions and deportations of potential applicants took
place in the period leading up to the FMR Amnesty’s implementation, throughout the
implementation of the FMR Amnesty programme itself there were relatively few reported
arrests of persons who came forward and applied.  However, all persons were registered on
                                        
57     See “Prohibited Persons” Abuse of Undocumented Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees,
Human Rights Watch, March 1998 and “Illegal?  Report on the arrest and detention of persons in
terms of the Aliens Control Act”, SA Human Rights Commission, Feb. 1999, the latter available at:
http://www.lhr.org.za/refugee/hrcreport.htm
58     “Illegal rampages by home affairs”, Mail and Guardian, 15-21 May 1998.
59   In a workshop held in late July 1998 at Kutlwanong Democracy Centre, Pretoria, the South African
Police Service (including the Border Police) along with representatives of the National Inter-
Departmental Structure on Border Control (NIDS) and other relevant national government
departments, expressed frustration with the Department of Home Affairs over their inability or
unwillingness to issue clear instructions for the handling of suspected illegal aliens.  Participants
expressed a willingness to adopt guidelines relating to the apprehension and detention of suspected
illegal aliens.  Unfortunately, nothing concrete came out of it, perhaps due to the lack of participation
from the Department of Home Affairs, which chose not to attend.
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the Department of Home Affairs computerised movement control system 60.  Local NGOs
(including RRP) were therefore partly successful in convincing provincial Department of
Home Affairs authorities to curtail the number of arrests61, as it was justifiably felt this would
scare off genuine applicants.
But they were not completely successful.  Indeed, RRP observed a number of instances of
potential applicants being stopped at roadblocks (searching for undocumented migrants)
and asked for their papers.  There were even allegations of documents being destroyed,
particularly by members of the Defence Force (SANDF)62.  More recently, there have been a
number of arrests reported to RRP of persons who qualified for amnesty, or were awaiting a
final decision on their application, following the government’s “raids” on suspected
undocumented migrants in Johannesburg 63.
6. Procedures for dealing with irregularities and abuses / Monitoring and
corrective mechanisms
There was felt to be a great need for an efficient and effective mechanism to prevent
abuses, including resources for rapid investigation and redress in cases where irregularities
were reported and confirmed 64.  Ideally, there should have been a centralised mechanism,
empowered to investigate and redress instances of confirmed irregularities (including a
                                        
60    Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, section 8
61    RRP noted that, during the implementation period, the provincial authorities did not make many
arrests even though many applicants were, in their view, “clearly bogus” (e.g. the applicants only
spoke Portuguese and arrived at application points in vehicles with Mozambican number plates).
62    In South Africa, there are essentially three departments responsible for controlling the movement
of people within the Republic’s borders.  These are Safety and Security (border police), Defence
(military officers) and Home Affairs (immigration officers).  Concerns have frequently been raised
regarding overlapping jurisdiction for border control.  See Prohibited Persons report, Human Rights
Watch, Ibid., at p. 43-49.
63    “SA under fire over handling of aliens”, The Star, 17 March 2000
64   There were subsequently allegations of bribery and corruption.  African Eye New Service,
Nelspruit, 11 January 2000.
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disciplinary procedure for the offending officer, and access to the correct procedures for the
complainant), rather than one relying on redress from local officials, who could be potential
perpetrators themselves.  A suggestion by one of the Task Team members of establishing a
central point where reports of abuses could be dealt was at one stage endorsed, but not
ultimately accepted by the department.
Following regional meetings held with outreach partners65, DHA officials provided
opportunities for “taking up issues” and following up complaints. This alternative was agreed
to between outreach partners and the government, as an alternative to setting up an
appeals body.  In addition, there was one para-legal situated in each of the “mobile units”
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the procedure, providing legal advice and
raising complaints.  An RRP monitoring and evaluation team visited each of the “Mobile
Units” on a weekly basis, providing an overview of what was going on for all outreach
partners and, where necessary, referring issues to the regional meetings.
It was also recommended in the “setting up phase” that special attention be paid to the
Lindela facility66.  Lindela is the final transit point for suspected illegal aliens before they are
deported to their country of origin. Thus, it is an important filter point to catch potential
candidates for the regularisation programme who may have been wrongfully tracked into
deportation proceedings.  Apart from cases of “mistaken identity” or possibly detaining those
who might qualify for regularised status, it was evident that, since its inception, there had
been consistent and credible reports of extensive corruption amongst the junior Home
Affairs officials working at Lindela67.
                                        
65    AWEPA and the European Union Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa (EUFHRSA)
secured funding for local, South African NGOs to act as “outreach partners”.  These included South
African Council of Churches (SACC), National Association of Paralegals and Refugee Research
Programme.
66    Lindela Repatriation Centre,  in Krugersdorp (outside of Johannesburg) is a privately-run facility,
fully sub-contracted from the Department of Home Affairs.  It exists to detain undocumented migrants
while they await deportation.  For more on this facility, see Prohibited Persons report, Human Rights
Watch, Ibid., esp. pp. 69-85.
67    Numerous investigations culminated in an extensive report, Illegal? Report on the arrest and
detention of persons in terms of the Aliens Control Act, produced by the South African Human Rights
Commission in collaboration with others and released in February 1999.  See:
www.lhr.org.za/refugee/hrcreport.htm
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In the end, Lindela was not monitored during the period of applications, as the
regularisation programme and “mobile units” were restricted to receiving applications in the
rural provinces of Mpumalanga, Northern Province, Northwest Province and Northern Kwa-
Zulu Natal, but not the urban province of Gauteng, where Lindela is based 68.  However,
during the “appeals phase” (10 February – 10 May 2000), there were some cases followed-
up by local NGOs at Lindela.  These persons had been awaiting decisions on their
applications for FMR Amnesty, and were later arrested in a recent series of “raids” by police
officers in Gauteng Province.
7. The issue of fraudulent documentation
The Department stated that “during the SADC amnesty the main reasons for rejection were
crime or fraud”,69 which explained their uncompromising approach in dealing with these
issues in the FMR Amnesty.  The Department declared that, “No application from applicants
with false identity documents (would) be approved”.  It further stated that there would be
“no condonation” of this offence and “applicants (would) be removed from the country”70.
While the local NGOs participating in the Task Team felt such allegations of fraud were over-
stated, it was nevertheless acknowledged that fraud was possible, but required some
explanation, and especially specific guidance at the outset as to how such cases would be
dealt with.  One NGO proposed to the Task Team that, in the event an applicant had
committed fraud, a “bargain” could have been made between the applicant and the
authorities.  This could have been based on the models of other programmes requiring “full
disclosure”, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (gaining
applicants immunity from prosecution) and the United States Immigration and Naturalisation
                                        
68   In addition to special care in the training of Lindela officials, LHR raised the necessity of publicly
posting information at the Lindela facility relating to the regularisation program and phone numbers
which can be called to report irregularities.  But this was never done.
69    Also, E. Mahlutshana, “The view from home affairs” in The New South Africans?, Op Cit., p. 28
70    Section 4 of the Department of Home Affairs Press Release, dated 18 August 1999.
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Service model, permitting the government to waive what would otherwise be exclusion from
the procedure71.
7.1 “Survival Fraud”
It was widely believed that many of those who fulfilled the criteria for the SADC amnesty
and regularisation programme obtained fraudulent identification documents either to secure
their entry into South Africa or increase the security of their residency once they had arrived
in the Republic.  These individuals included those who obtained ID documents using names
which were not, in fact, their own names, and individuals with two or more different
identification documents.  Nonetheless, these persons potentially met the criteria for the
regularisation programme; they could legitimately be categorised as individuals who
committed a form of “survival fraud.”  In order to encourage persons (who might otherwise
have feared apprehension and deportation as undocumented migrant) to apply to the
regularisation programme, outreach partners proposed to the Task Team that these
individuals should be able to apply and have their applications considered “without
prejudice”.  This was never agreed, though it did have the support of senior provincial
officials, including the former Premier of Mpumalanga Province, who had similar experiences
himself years earlier, as a (South African) refugee in Mozambique.
7.2 Errors
It was further felt that a clear indication was required in terms of the effect of errors in the
application procedure itself.  In any large-scale programme of this nature, there are
inevitably cases of both intentional fraud, as well as errors in the application procedure, one
common mistake being the date of birth.  While it was anticipated that the number of simple
errors would be quite small given the nature of the outreach programme, it was still
expected that they would occur.  In other words, errors of fraud and some errors of mistake
were anticipated.  It was proposed to the Task Team (by LHR)72 that there be a degree of
                                        
71    Klaaren, J., book review of J Crush and V Williams (eds) The New South Africans?  Immigration
Amnesties and Their Aftermath, (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 574-576.
72    LHR submission to the Task Team in September 1998
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leniency towards those who had clearly committed a “mistake” (rather than intentional
fraud), and otherwise had not intended to mislead the authorities, but this proposal was also
never agreed.
8. Applicants’ rights in the procedure, information pamphlet and information
campaign
With regard to the initial procedure, those coming forward to apply for regularisation needed
to be issued with certain documentation, namely a temporary permit and an information
pamphlet informing them of their rights, complemented by an extensive information
campaign.
8.1 Temporary permits
Local NGO members of the Task Team proposed that an applicant’s permit be valid for the
period in which their application was under examination (e.g. for the six-month duration of
the regularisation programme, allowing possible extension if the decision was not made
within this period).  The period ultimately agreed (through “trial and error”), was for three
month renewable permits, which greatly increased the Department’s administrative burden.
Rejected applicants ought to have been given either a reasonable period of time to leave the
Republic on their own initiative (including time to tend to their personal affairs) or consider
appealing a rejected decision.  It was further recommended that full details of the appeal
procedure be included with the notice of rejection.
The Department at one stage indicated that the period from the date the applicant received
a written rejection, and was expected either to appeal or leave the country, would be one
21 days73.  This period was ultimately extended to one-month, in consideration of the fact
that many of these persons had been settled in the Republic for some time.  Temporary
permits were granted to appealing applicants in terms of s.41 of the Aliens Control Act 96 of
                                        
73    This was an agreement determined at an inter-provincial planning meeting between government
and NGO outreach partners.
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199174.  Details of the procedure were not specified in the Guidelines, but were detailed in
the information pamphlet.  The Guidelines specified that applications were to be decided by
officials “at the level of Senior Administrative Officer / Control Immigration Officer”75.  There
were no details provided regarding the appeals procedure, only that they would be
considered by officials of the ranking of “ASD level” 76, though persons appealing rejected
decisions were ultimately given extended permits in terms of section 41.
8.2 Information pamphlet
The information pamphlet was important, as it was unlikely that applicants would have had
the benefit of legal representation.  The applicants “rights” should have included the effects
of a successful / unsuccessful application (including procedures and time periods for appeal)
and the period and circumstances under which they would be required to leave the country
if their application was finally rejected.
The information pamphlet should also have made clear the applicant’s rights in the event
they were apprehended as suspected illegal aliens.  Similarly, the procedure for voluntary
departure from the Republic should have been described in the pamphlet.  In particular,
their legal position should have been clear regarding “interim protection” during the period
leading up to the implementation of assisted return programmes.
In the final information pamphlet neither of these rights were specified.  The pamphlet only
explained those who were entitled to apply, what the procedure was (including the
documents needed), where and when to apply and that it was not necessary to prove that
                                        
74    This section in the Aliens Control Act is customarily used in respect of persons awaiting final
judgement in a court case.  More recently, it has been used to “except” persons who have lodged
applications for political asylum.
75   Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, section 3(a)
76   Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, section 3(b).  To no great surprise, there was subsequently
much confusion over the appeals process, and a number of appeals are currently outstanding at a
senior departmental level.  There is a possibility of court challenges to decisions made under this
procedure, by way of judicial review.
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one had a job (a crucial distinction from the SADC Amnesty) 77.  As an alternative, para-
legals (not officials) verbally explained an applicant’s rights in explaining the purpose of the
s.41 permit.  While the RRP observed that this was the only effective method in dealing with
applicants who were, for the most part, illiterate, there remains much uncertainty as to what
in fact applicants’ rights were in the procedure.
8.3 Information Campaign
The information campaign, notifying potential applicants about the programme, was
originally intended as a major component of the local NGOs’ involvement, in reference to
detailed recommendations by local experts knowledgeable of the mistakes made in the
earlier, SADC amnesty78.  Unfortunately, the campaign was ultimately quite restricted,
attributed largely to delays in the start date by the Department of Home Affairs.
There were one or two news articles detailing the programme, but very little publication in
the mainstream press.  However, local radio stations were used for 2 weeks prior to the
start-date.  There were also community meetings held in all of the major FMR settlement
locations79.
A media statement by the Department of Home Affairs was only released 9 days after the
programme had begun80.  A condensed information pamphlet produced by the Task Team
was translated into all the relevant local languages and distributed.  However, its circulation
was confined to Mpumalanga, Northwest Kwa Zulu Natal and Northern Provinces, in areas
where there had previously been refugee camps/settlements.
                                        
77    It also, helpfully, indicated that no fee was required, presumably part of an effort to limit
corruption.
78     “Legalising the status of Mozambican former-refugees”, Ibid, item 3 and V. Williams, ‘Lessons for
the Third Amnesty’, The New South Africans?  Ibid, pp. 86-87.
79    RRP observed that locally-spread information was much more effective than newspaper articles,
which were read more by local South Africans rather than the FMRs.  At the end of the day, RRP felt
that the information campaign in the FMR amnesty was more effective than that of SADC.
80     Department of Home Affairs, Media Release, dated 18 August 1999.
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The end result was that few persons or NGOs outside these rural areas (other than those
directly involved) were aware that the procedure was to be implemented from the 10th of
August.
9. Conclusion
It is our conclusion that, on one hand, many of the problems encountered by the Task Team
were anticipated, and could thus have been avoided had the programme’s organisers given
greater credence to the concerns raised by local NGOs (as indicated above).  Indeed, the
Department of Home Affairs confirmed some time before the regularisation programme
began that it was “unlikely that anything (would) be done differently” from the previous
amnesties81.  In other words, the “confusion and uncertainty” in connection with the
previous amnesties seemed destined to be repeated in the FMR amnesty.
There were some notable successes in the programme’s implementation observed by RRP,
which cannot be over-looked.  These included: the constructive working relationships which
developed between local NGOs and government officials (particularly at regional levels),
better dissemination of information during the course of the programme’s implementation
and the support which para-legals provided to applicants.
In short, while implementation of the regularisation procedure was faced with numerous
problems, often of a complex nature82, there were also some positive results.  Perhaps the
greatest benefit (observed by RRP) was the “autonomy” given to the regional offices that
allowed for a certain amount of “flexibility and adaptability”83.
                                        
81  V. Williams, Ibid, p. 85
82    E-mail communication by N. Johnston, 12 February 1999, to SAIMMIG list-server, a discussion
list of 150 members focussing on migration issues in the country:  “We feel it is important to get wider
inputs from other actors in the field of migration on some of the issues we are encountering – many of
which are pretty complex!” (sic)
83   Confirmed in Department Instruction No. 34 of 1999, s. 3, which permitted decisions to be taken
by regional officials.
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While the FMR Amnesty programme will continue to be evaluated by the outreach partners
themselves, we hope that a more comprehensive, independent evaluation of the FMR
Regularisation Programme will take place.  This would be crucial in order to assess fully (and
objectively) the successes and failures, as this paper can only touch upon a few issues from
primarily a legal / human rights perspective.  Issues relating to the vagueness of the
procedure, non-transparent “political negotiations”, non-transparent funding situation and
restricted information campaign all need to be carefully analysed, also in the context of what
was “forewarned” by various commentators and local NGO members of the Task Team84.
Equally, we feel that an assessment of the consequent value and/or detriment of political
discussions that took place between the organisation AWEPA and the two governments
concerned, the co-ordinating role played by AWEPA and the subsidiary role in this process
played by local NGOs, would be important.
At the end of the day, the great deal of time that passed between the making of the cabinet
decision and actual implementation of the programme was widely felt to be the main cause
of concern.  During this period, there were numerous allegations of maltreatment of
foreigners by authorities, resulting in a number of potentially eligible applicants being
arrested and deported 85.  Again, additional research is needed in order to make a final
assessment of this programme, determine what lessons can be learnt, both for the benefit
of government and NGOs in similar, large-scale operations in future.
                                                                                                                              
84   A key issue of concern that arose in our own organisations’ involvement in the project, and
subsequent investigations, concerns the role of a foreign NGO in going beyond fund-raising and
taking the responsibility for organising such a complex exercise, in particular taking responsibility for
“political guidance”, and co-ordination. There was a strong feeling that a great deal of the
recommendations contained in various documents referred to in this article, many of which were the
product of extensive research, were largely ignored by the organisers.  In particular, a comprehensive
collection of research, which brought together a number of experts commenting on earlier amnesties
and contained detailed, additional recommendations for the implementation of this, the “third”
amnesty, did not appear to be taken very seriously.  See V. Williams, ‘Lessons for the Third Amnesty’,
(Ibid), pp. 84 – 88, Legal Issues Raised by the ‘Status Regularisation Programme’ for Mozambican
Former Refugees, presented to the Task Team, LHR, September 1998 and various minutes of Task
Team meetings. This major oversight may have played a role in the difficulties subsequently faced in
the programme’s implementation.
85 V. Williams, Ibid, p. 84 and Johnstone, Selabi and Simbine, “The Usual Victims”, in Beyond Control,
ed. J. Crush, SAMP, 1998
